

NOTA.

La publicación del general La-Madrid, ha sido acusada, como calumniosa y difamatoria, por los Sres. Jenerales, D. Ignacio Alvarez, D. Braulio Costa, Dr. D. Antonio Rodriguez, hijo del general D. Murin, D. Juan Antonio Lezica, D. Manuel Antonio Castro y D. Pablo Goyena, los tres últimos a nombre tambien de sus respectivos padres.



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THE PRESENT SITUATION.

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A LETTER ADDRESSD TO THE NACIONAL, N.^o 1953 OF THE
18th JUNE 1845, TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH.

by Mr. Pfeil.
Adelphi R.

MONTEVIDEO:
1845.

THE PRESENT SITUATION.

Under this head the *Gaceta Mercantil* of Rosas, of the 10th inst, has published an article in which—more than in any other that has appeared within the last two years—an endeavour is made to invert the most notorious falsehoods with the appearance of facts, supported by authentic documents.

The evident purpose of this publication has been to bias the judgment of the agents entrusted with the pacification of the Rio de la Plata, by presenting them with a false view of the present state of affairs.

The appearance of truth and moderation with which this deception is prepared, renders a refutation necessary to confound its authors.

Commencing with the acts of Rosas, which, according to the *Gaceta*, prove his respect and interest for the independence of Montevideo, the first is, that "in 1838 he maintained the independence and legal government of the Republic, over thrown by a rebellion supported by the French agents; and continued to acknowledge the legal principle, and to assist the Orientals to preserve their independence."

The right and obligation of the Argentine government to interfere in the event of intestine war, on behalf of the Oriental government, had been stipulated in the treaty of Peace of 1828 between that country and Brazil. The right, and with it the obligation, were to last only five years after the constitution were sworn to: (art. 4 of the Treaty) this was sworn to in July of 1830, consequently the right expired in the same month of 1835.

The revolution of 1832, headed by general Lavalleja



against the first Constitutional government, presided over by general Rivera, had a most active cooperator in Rosas. The Argentine schooner "Invincible" captured near Maldonado by order of the government in September of that year, was found to have on board sixteen cases of arms and a considerable quantity of ammunition, conveyed from the arsenal of Buenos Ayres for Lavalleja.

The latter having been overcome, took refuge at Buenos Ayres. He there raised men whom he armed, equipped and mounted with means obtained from the same arsenal; and in 1834 he again invaded this country, embarking from Buenos Ayres for the purpose.

Rosas, with characteristic duplicity, ordered by public decree, that an investigation should be instituted into the flight of General Lavalleja.

Being again worsted, Lavalleja sheltered himself a second time at Buenos Ayres; where, notwithstanding his previous flight, he was received and treated with the highest considerations.

Rosas was, still then, bound by a Treaty with Brazil to protect the legal government of the Republic; and in lieu of protecting it, he armed Lavalleja against it.

In 1838 when the excesses of Oribe provoked a rising in the country, Rosas had neither the right nor the obligation to interfere in the struggle, for the time stipulated in the convention with Brazil had concluded in 1835. Nevertheless he took military possession of Paisandú with a corps of infantry commanded by D. Antonio Toll, and placed it at the service of Oribe against Rivera, jointly with an Argentine flotilla. (See the various dispatches of Garzon, Oribe's officer at Paisandú, in which he mentions the proceedings of the Argentine land and sea forces; published here by Oribe and by Rosas at Buenos Ayres. (1)

We see, then, that in 1832 and 1834, when he was bound to protect the legal government presided by Gene-

(1) In what waysoever party spirit may persist in considering the isolated & covert aggression of Rosas in the affairs of the Orientales, or those of Chiefs of this Republic in Rosas', the most unquestionable fact is, that the first act of intervention, official, public & ostensible, came from Rosas, by the occupation of Paysandú, & by placing his flotilla in the service of Oribe.

Rosa's flag was the one hoisted in those vessels, & his flag was that of the infantry which occupied the territory of the Republic.



ral Rivera, he attacked it openly through Lavalleja; and in 1838, when he no longer had the right to interfere, he did interfere directly with troops by land and water.

In 1839 Rosas invaded the Republic with a powerful army, which he did not put under Oribe's orders, for reasons we shall explain presently; but he entrusted it to General Echague, a man entirely devoted to him; and, at that time, Governor of Entre Rios. This army, which never passed beyond Cagancha, was approaching Montevideo when Rosas, writing to General Echague on the 26th of September, and still putting forward the farce of legality and liberty of elections, makes use of literally the following words:

"On the departure of General Oribe we have conferred together as to what may be most suitable and desirable when the exercise of his legal authority shall be reestablished in the Oriental Republic. And with the satisfaction that is a consequence, I acquaint you that he goes determined to call together the Legislative Power and to hand over to them, in due form, the staff without stain, in order that they may, with perfect liberty, elect the person who shall preside over the state. And as you are at this moment in the best situation to know, or to form a correct judgment, as to the person whom it will be advisable they should select, so he (Oribe) is well disposed to exert himself in this sense, so soon as he speaks to you, or before, if necessary, in favour of the candidate whom in your opinion you esteem best adapted; as considering advantageous his election and elevation to the Presidency.

This letter, the original of which signed by Rosas was taken among the papers of Echague at the battle of Cagancha, reveals, at one view, the designs of Rosas and of Oribe. The candidate for the Oriental presidency when Echague had taken Montevideo, was not to be the one chosen by the Nation, but the person Echague himself, Governor of Entre-Rios, Chief of Rosa's army, should, in his opinion, consider best adapted; and Oribe was well disposed to exert himself in favour of that candidate, after consulting with Echague, or before if necessary.

This is the respect and interest of Rosas for the independence of Montevideo. Not one of these recorded facts can be denied.

"In 1840"—continues the *Gaceta*—he remembered it (the independence of Montevideo) in the convention of the 29th of October, with France.

What means to remember the independence of one

country in a Treaty with another? That of Montevideo was an established fact since 1828, guaranteed by the Argentine Republic, and Brazil, and by Great Britain as mediator. Rosas in the Convention with France only said, "that he continued to consider this country in a state of perfect independence" (art. 4.) But in no manner could he avoid doing this; and that article was therefore nothing more than a deception practised on the French negociator; and acknowledged to be such by the universal opinion of the press and the Tribune of France.

"In 1843, he maintained it in opposition to the pretensions of the Brazilian government, by refusing to ratify the treaty of March, in which the Ministry of Rio Janeiro proposed an interfering alliance during and subsequently to the war." (*The Gaceta*.)

That treaty is a foul and indelible stain upon the Brazilian Ministry that proposed and signed it. Deceit, improvisation, and complete abdication of the dignity of the Empire, a childish fear above all, presided over the celebration of that compact, from which at this day Señor Carneiro Leao would fain detach his name, but that is now impossible. The deed and the name of its author are bound together with a ring of iron, to appear together before the tribunal of Brazilian public opinion.

The duplicity of Rosas was nevertheless still greater in refusing to ratify that compact. Before we proceed to prove this, we have to make an important observation as to the respect paid by the Dictator to the legality of Oribe.

The latter had been sheltered at Buenos Aires since October 1838.

In July 1839 Rosas invaded the Oriental territory, confiding his army to Echague and not to the *legal President*.—The reason was very cogent. Oribe had not then yet contracted the obligations by which Rosas binds men to his system; obligations of crime and blood. Without this apprenticeship Oribe could not hope that Rosas would support *his legality*. Consequently, on the 27th of September 1839, when Echague was near Montevideo, Oribe sallied forth for the first time from Buenos Aires, "at the head of a brilliant division composed of five hundred men well armed, uniformed and equipped . . . to engage the Unitarian Savage Lavalle, either alone, or incorporated with the forces of Entre Rios and Santa Fé." (1) Then it was not designed that Oribe should come to

(1) Letter from Rosas to Echague of the 26th September 1839 taken at Cagancha.

maintain his legal government, nor the independence of his country, so much respected by Rosas; he was to go and fight against Lavalle and the unitarians in Entre-Rios for account of the Dictator. He has answered me (says Rosas in his letter) full of enthusiasm and conformably disposed, burning, as is natural, in the most earnest desires to assist with his troops, and even to march himself and assist in fighting *against such unitarian savages*."

So it fell out.—Oribe went through *four years* of apprenticeship, making merit with Rosas before he invaded his country in January 1843. In those four years he fought in Entre-Rios, Santa Fé, Córdoba, Tucuman, and Salta, whilst Rosas, whom he served, never had regard for any purpose to the legal Presidency of the Republic of Uruguay. But after Oribe had laid waste the Argentine Provinces as far as the Bolivian frontier, when he had beheaded Colonel Vilela, the Governor Avellaneda whose head he set up in the market place, Colonel Borda, whose ears he sent salted, as a present to Buenos Aires; when he had sacrificed all the prisoners taken at Tucuman, Catamarca and every where else; when he had given orders to *follow the scent of the dead body of General Lavalle, that he might cut off its head*; when Rosas had published all these deeds in the *Gaceta*, authenticated with the signature of Oribe, then it was that he had him for ever bound to his cause, and only then did he confide to him the invasion of the Oriental State, *five years after his expulsion from it*.

To return to the treaty with Brazil. The complete triumph obtained by Rosas at Arroyo Grande (December 1842) was, in the opinion of many, the infallible precursor of the submission of the Oriental Republic. The Brazilian minister Carneiro Leao saw it invaded by an army comparatively formidable, when there was not a soldier in the Oriental territory, and feared that the latter being subjected, the conquering army would fall on Rio Grande: this dread overcame him; he had not courage to face the danger as brave nations do, and chose rather to beg of Guido to celebrate that treaty, from which he was destined to reap no other fruit than shame and the repulse of Rosas. (1)

(1) There is a curious fact that shows how much the mind may be distracted by an action that conscience condemns. The treaty was signed on the 24th of March 1843, and its preamble says, that the plenipotentiaries *exchanged their respective full powers*. Notwithstanding, three days afterwards, that is, on the 27th of March, the same day on

A repulse that any one must have foreseen, inasmuch as it was a necessary consequence of the Dictator's designs upon the Oriental territory.

In march 1843, the date of the treaty, Oribe had just arrived in front of Montevideo with that formidable and victorious army. The news-papers of Rosas, his official documents, all his acts display his perfect conviction that resistance was impracticable. He was thus assured by Oribe by Maza and by Pacheco; and the surrender of Montevideo was considered a matter in which nothing was doubtful but *the day on which it was to take place.*

Rosas, as master of Montevideo and of all the Montevidean territory, which he then occupied with an army of 17000 men entirely his own, would have attained what he sought since 1838, when he sent Echague to reduce the country; he would have been in a situation to have named the candidate whom in his opinion he considered best adapted; in a word, he would have been the absolute lord of the country subjected to his army.

In these circumstances, the proposal of a treaty in which Brazil invoked "the solemn obligation to defend the political existence of the Oriental Republic, in accordance with the 3d article of the Preliminary Convention of Peace": a treaty by which Brazil was to have the same number of troops and the same influence as Rosas in the country; was to deprive him at a blow, of the longed for fruit of his victory; it was to give him an importunate companion, when he might sieze the prize alone. He alone, without the help of any one, thought to have subjected the Banda Oriental; how can it be imagined that he would give up a part to Brazil, who had rendered him no assistance, and that he should, moreover, take upon himself the obligation to go and fight on behalf of the Empire, against the Rio Grandenses?

It was folly to think it; the whole of the political life of Rosas was there to prove that he would reject such a proposal with contempt; and Carneiro Leao shewed little judgement indeed when he hoped the treaty would be ratified.

which the Emperor ratified the treaty, a protocol was drawn up and signed, in which the same plenipotentiaries declared, that Guido *was unprovided with special powers to sign the treaty*; that he would ask them of Rosas, and so soon as he received them they should be exchanged with those of their Excellencies the Ministers Plenipotentiary of His Imperial Majesty. What were, then, the powers which, in the treaty, are said to *have been exchanged?* "E cosi va zoppicando il mondo."

Rosas spurned it with the gesture of a sovereign: and he was right.

Meanwhile that was the clear and evident motive of Rosas in rejecting the treaty. Of course when Brazil brought forward the obligation binding on both countries to protect the Independence of Montevideo, Rosas was forced to simulate respect for that independence, in the language he made use of, but in nothing more than in language; and it is absurd to pretend that his own and sole word is a proof that he rejected the treaty out of respect for the legality of Oribe's government and the independence of the Republic, when all the acts we have mentioned demonstrate his repeated attacks against it.

No: it was the reverse: he rejected it because that treaty prevented him from disposing at his will of the Republic, and gave him a companion in his conquest.

The *Gaceta* goes on to say, that Oribe now governs freely throughout the territory, and that moreover *he commands des upwards of Eight thousand Orientals, who have taken arms to sustain him.*"

This is the utmost to which the want of respect for truth can be carried. The forces that Oribe commands are those in front of Montevideo, and those which under the orders of Urquiza triumphed at India Muerta.

In order not to present statements so false as those forged by the *Gaceta*, we will omit mentioning the force of each battalion of those that are in front of Montevideo, But we will give their names and whence they proceed.

<i>Names of the Corps.</i>	<i>Commanders.</i>	<i>Procedure.</i>
Libertad.....	Maza.....	Buenos-Ayres.
Independencia.....	Costa.....	do.
Libres de Buenos-Aires..	Ramos.....	do.
Rebajados.....	Ramiro.....	do.
Volunteers of Oribe.....	Artagaveitia.....	Basques.
Libertad Oriental.....	Lasala.....	{ (said to be Orientals.)
Defenders of Oriental Independence.....	Rincon.....	{ Entrerrianos Correntinos &c.
Comp. Defenders of Oribe.....	F. Oribe.....	{ Canarians, farmers &c.
National Guard.....	Sienra, Areta..	{ Orientals.
Four companies.....	Arechaga y Balparda.....	

These are the corps of infantry that Oribe has in front of Montevideo; of these there is only *one battalion and four companies* of Orientals. It may be that among the *Defenders of Oribe* there are also a few; but it is no less certain that many of the soldiers of Rincon's battalion are from Buenos Ayres, Entre Ríos and other places; for many of the prisoners taken at Arroyo Grande and elsewhere have been drafted into his battalion and that of Lasala.

In respect to the cavalry force, the greatest number of Orientals ought to be found there; for all our country people are cavalry soldiers, and it is not known that Oribe has organized any battalion of infantry composed of Oriental peasants. Well, then. Let us take the most unimpeachable document—Urquiza's report of the battle of India Muerta. According to that account, the forces that fought there on the 17th of last March were the following:

- Right wing*—1st. division—*Entre Riano*. six squadrons.
 One company of the *Entre-Riano* battalion.
- Flanks*.—One squadron *Entre-Riano* Dragoons.
 Lancers No. 1. ° of the line, Buenos Aires.
 No. 1. of the 9th *Entre-Riano* division
 One squadron of Orientales
- Reserve*—First squadron *Escort of Liberty* (we do not know if it is Oriental but we allow that it is)
 N. ° 2 and 3 of Florés division (all of Buenos Ayres).
- Centre*— 2nd company and chasseurs of the *Entre Riano* squadron.
 A piquet of artillery, of the same.
- Left wing*—3rd *Entre Riano* division: four squadrons
 3rd Company *Entre Riano* battalion
 One squadron Orientales.
- Flanks* — N. ° 3 of *Buenos Ayres* with one company Volunteers of Colonia
 Two Companies Volunteers of Colonia and Soriano.
 N. ° 4 of *Buenos Ayres*
 Dragoons of *Buenos Ayres*
- Reserve*. — 6th *Entre Riano* Division, 4 squadrons and two *companies* from Minas and Maldonado.
- From this minute statement made by Urquiza in his dispatches it results that the cavalry army in campaign consists of—
- | | | |
|----|-----------|---------------------|
| 17 | squadrons | <i>Entre Rianos</i> |
| 6 | do | <i>Buenos Ayres</i> |
| 3 | do | <i>Orientales</i> . |

And besides, five companies of *Oriental volunteers*.

As to the *infantry*, Urquiza neither mentions, nor was there a single piquet of Orientals.

Three squadrons and five companies of cavalry, and one battalion and four companies of infantry, are all the forces composed of Orientals that Oribe has under his orders. If anything may be added it can only be some straggling parties that can amount but to very little. Can these corps form upwards of eight thousand Orientals in arms. The falsehood is so glaring that it appears probable an error of a cypher has been made, and that the *Gaceta* intended to say 800, for the corps mentioned do not reach even to that number.

There is another demonstration of this ridiculous falsehood that leaves no room for reply. The forces of Rosas that crossed the Uruguay commanded by Oribe, were, according to their own documents, (1) as follows

	<i>Infantry.</i>	<i>Cavalry.</i>
Under the immediate command of Oribe	7,000	
Under that of his brother Don Ignacio	640	5000
Under Urquiza	500	4000
Total	8140	9000

So the forces of Rosas that crossed over to this territory numbered 17000 men. Let it be supposed, what Oribe will not be willing to confess, that he has lost 6000 men in the 28 months campaign: he ought still to have more than eleven thousand of all arms, of those he brought from the Argentine Republic. If he has armed upwards of eight thousand Orientals here, Oribe must at this moment have nearly twenty thousand men under his orders. Where, then, is this force? In what part of the territory is it hidden, that it is neither to be seen, nor felt, excepting that besieging Montevideo, and what Urquiza commands? Neither here, nor on the Eastern coast, so much frequented by neutral vessels till quite lately, nor in Rio Grande, nor even in Buenos Ayres are any other forces known than those which occupy the two points above mentioned. In front of Montevideo, no one, absolutely no one, calculates Oribe's force to reach five thousand men of all arms. Urquiza says in his despatch from India Muerta that he went into action with 3000 men. Allow him to have two thousand more, though it is not known where they are, and even then we cannot make up the number of

(1) See N. ° 862 and 865 of the *British Packet of Buenos Ayres* dated 25th of February and 18th March 1843.

eleven thousand soldiers from Buenos Ayres that ought to be in this territory.

Where are then these *eight thousand Orientals in arms*? For whose belief does the *Gaceta* write these absurdities?

It further says; that out of pure consideration for the great number of foreigners comprised within this city has Oribe *not attempted an assault*. This admits of only one answer; *many thanks for the consideration*. But this answer ought to be given by the foreigners. We, who are not included in Oribe's kindness, will only ask him; out of what consideration has Oribe several nights cannonaded the city, elevating his guns and knowing very well that he could not touch the line of fortification? Those cannonades had no effective warlike purpose whatever; why were they ordered?

"The foreigners, continues the *Gaceta*, constructed the trenches of Montevideo, some with materials, others with their daily labour, and the British squadron, commanded by "Comodore Purvis, with its engineers."

No foreigner has *given* materials for the fortification; no one has worked gratuitously on them: if this be untrue let the *Gaceta* name one.—Many have sold materials, and many more have worked for hire which was paid them daily. But we have no knowledge of any principle of international law or good reason, that prohibits a foreigner, residing in a belligerent country, from selling to the government of that country the goods he may have in his warehouses, or manufactured by him; or from employing his strength as a day labourer in public works, not being forced to do so.

With respect to the *engineers* of the squadron commanded by Comodore Purvis, the *Gaceta* has stamped a gratuitous and intentional lie. In the first place, we are not aware that the ships of the British naval station had a single engineer on board in 1843, and why should they? But we very well know that none was asked for, none was lent, belonging to any foreign squadron. The trenches were first opened on the 9th of January 1843, and it is clear that before this work was commenced, their lines had been traced. On the 1st of February, when the wall was already raised and the ditch dug to nearly the whole extent of the line, one of our Generals, by especial commission from the government took upon himself to direct and *conclude* the works. The Montevideo newspapers of that period shew their daily progress. Well then; Commodore Purvis dit not come to the River Plate till the 7th of February; on which day the fortifications were finished, and the platforms for artillery were commenced. An undeniable proof of this is, that on

the 16th of February, the day Oribe encamped at the Cerro, the fortifications were completed, the artillery mounted, ready to receive him; and so much so, that he has stood still before them to this day.—The *Gaceta*, then, has voluntarily violated truth, and it cannot have done so from ignorance in treating of matters so public.

With the same degree of truth the *Gaceta* adds that the authority of Oribe "is reestablished throughout the Oriental territory;" that, "of the horde of Rivera and other unitarian savages there does not exist one man in arms in the Oriental country."

The *legal authority* of Oribe is nowhere established in the Oriental territory. But in many places there is established the *military authority of the General in Chief of the Argentine army*; because those places are militarily occupied by him. The authority that heads all its official acts, with the words *viva la Confederacion Argentina, death to the unitarian savages!* neither is, nor can be, a legal authority, of the Uruguay Republic, where there are neither *federation, unitarians, nor savages*. The authority that receives the salaries of all its chiefs and officers, of all the troops it commands and even of the corps denominated *Orientales*, from the public treasury of Buenos Ayres, is not the legal authority of this Republic. And it is from that treasury all the forces commanded by Oribe are paid, equipped, armed and provided. If there be any one who doubts it, let him apply to that same number of the *Gaceta* containing the article we are now answering, and he will there find among the *payments* from the General treasury of Buenos Ayres, on *monday the 9th of June 1843*, the following entries—

Dollars.

Assignment to the "Defenders of Oriental independence".....	4324
Chiefs and officers of the Oriental state.....	2536
Assignment to the same.....	46314
Assignment to the army of the vanguard (which is that commanded by Oribe).....	277063
Pay of the battalion "Defenders of Oriental independence," for the year 1843.....	4216
Do. of the same for 1844.....	4488

We see then, by this official document of Rosas, that all the troops commanded by Oribe, Argentines and Orientals, all the Oriental chiefs and officers, receive their pay, and that part of it given to their families, from the public

treasury of Buenos Ayres. And the *Gaceta* calls those people a *legal authority of the Oriental State*, in the same number in which he publishes that document.

That of the national forces, which the *Gaceta* styles *unitarians*, "there does not exist one man in arms in the Oriental country," is another extravagant falsehood. Colonels Flores and Camacho are at the head of divisions of Orientals, and although the incommunication between the capital and the interior does not allow us to point out with precision the other chiefs who are acting similarly, it is well known that several have combined, and maintain a considerable portion of the forces that were beaten at India Muerta.

But allowing that the assertion of the *Gaceta* were strictly true; who has declared that the *fact* of losing a battle decides irrevocably *the right*, and the independence of a country? If the victory obtained by Urquiza with an entirely foreign army, is, in the opinion of the *Gaceta*, tantamount to the establishment of Oribe's authority throughout the Republic, why does he maintain that Oribe is still a *Legal President*, after the several victories obtained over him, in 1838, by arms altogether Oriental, which expelled him from the territory from which he was five years absent and to which he has only returned when supported by the bayonets of Rosas.

As a proof of its veracity, the *Gaceta* publishes a curious statement of the forces of our garrison, *active and passive*, on the 24th May last; and makes them amount in all to *three thousand six hundred and twenty six men*, including the garrison of the Cerro &c. His statement has come to hand very opportunely, as on the 12th instant, a review of the army of the Capital was held, at which the entire population saw, and counted, one by one, more than *four thousand active soldiers*, who marched along the Calle de Sarandi to the new market place, at a distance of twenty four hundred yards from the inner lines, and more than three thousand from the outer fortifications; and this without an attempt on the part of the terrible army of Oribe, increased by *Eight thousand Orientales in arms*, to attack our lines whilst their defenders were so far away from them, and went through their manœuvres under the eye of Oribe who regarded from his strongholds. This plainly proves that while those four thousand men passed in review, the interior and exterior lines remained covered with sufficient forces to defend them in case of an attack of Oribe, whose outposts are not a thousand yards distant from ours.—This was in fact the case: there remained at the lines all the corps of Dragoons, Sosas regiment, part of Flores, all

the garrison artillery; the respective guards of the troops in review, and the few men attached to the batteries on the sea side of the city. Let the *Gaceta* add this force to the garrisons of the Cerro (1) and Rat Island; let him put together that which was reviewed, and he will find the town to have been garrisoned by nearly six thousand soldiers; whose bearing equipment armament and behaviour he may ask for an account of from the innumerable witnesses who were present.

What answer is to be given to that of there being only 409 Orientals in all Montevideo? Without taking into account those that are in the three battalions of national guards and other corps, the whole of Flores' division, all the Dragoons, all Sosa's Regiment, are Orientals. But this is too ridiculous to merit reply.

Meanwhile we will ask the *Gaceta*; what were the 4500 men who, according to Urquiza's despatch, fought under the orders of General Rivera at India Muerta? They were all Oriental countrymen under an Oriental chief. What were the twenty six squadrons and the infantry Urquiza fought with on that day? They were all Entre Rianos and Buenos Ayreans, excepting *three squadrons* under an Entre Riano chief. On which side was the Oriental nationality?

The Government reckons in its ranks, within the city, a large number of foreigners in arms. This is true, and this is the most eloquent denunciation of the atrocious system of Rosas and Oribe, which obliges even indifferent foreigners to take up arms to defend themselves. But these corps fight side by side with the national corps, and receive their arms, clothing and the rest from the national treasury, since they were armed by the government of the nation. But Oribe crossed the Uruguay with 12500 men all foreigners; a few months afterwards Urquiza joined him with 4500 more all foreigners. The Orientals that have joined him form an insignificant minority; and even these, like Oribe, their chiefs and officers, are, and have been, in the pay of Rosas, and the expenditure is officially published by the Treasury of Buenos Aires.

(1) The *Gaceta* says that Oribe has not attacked the city "out of consideration for the foreigners that are-in-it." And the Cerro, why has he not attacked it? According to the *Gaceta* it is defended by only "one hundred and fifteen men of Flores division," why has not Oribe taken it? Because the courage he had to pay the person who should have blown-it up with gunpowder, is not sufficient to put him at the head of a column of attack.

On which side is the Oriental nationality? Let Oribe himself answer, if shame will allow him to speak.

What character does he bear before his country, before the Powers of the earth?

There is in this matter a recent fact which proves, more forcibly than any other, the detestation in which Oribe and his hordes are held by the inhabitants of this country. The army under the command of General Rivera was followed by families, amounting to upwards of six thousand persons, as is confessed by Dionisio Coronel & Urquiza in their dispatches; the first, of the attack of the Cerro Largo; the other, of the battle of India Muerta. On the defeat of Riveraethes, 6000 persons all emigrated to the Brazil, where they are by no means obliged to remain. Urquiza several times demanded that they should be delivered up: Count Caxias has given full liberty to all families to return. Nevertheless not one has returned to suffer the accidental domination of Oribe; & according to an official document, which Government lately received, more than *ten thousand mouths* (we copy the original expression) are, now, maintained in Rio Grande, preferring the bitter bread of foreign charity to the domination of Oribe, who says he is surrounded with the love of Oriental nation.

This irresistibly eloquent fact proves, that a battle gained by a ferocious conquerer does not signify the establishment of his authority by the will of the nation conquered. A battle is a *fact*. The independence of a country is founded on right.

In his eagerness to put forward figures, to give a semblance of veracity, the *Gaceta* publishes a list of the foreign naval forces that are in the River Plate; but this list only serves to give the measure of truth of those who furnish the *Gaceta* with news. Let us see.

He gives the British corvette "Satellite" 22 guns, she only carries 18.

He gives the steam frigate Firebrand 11, she carries 6.

To the French frigate Africaine. . . . 60, she carries 44.

To the Erigone. 60, she has. . . 44.

To the Dassas. 22, she has. . . 20.

He mentions two French steamers, while there is only one, and the other, which he calls the "Eilau", has never been in the River Plate.

He mentions five Brazilian corvettes and there are only four.

He calls the corvette "Uniao" Chuao.
the sardinian frigate "Aguila" Arguella.
the sardinian brig "Eridano" Esculano.

So that the *Gaceta* supposes 43 guns and two ships that do not exist; and completely alters the names of three vessels. By the degree of correctness of the *Gaceta's* correspondent in this respect, we may judge of his account of the review, as well as in other matters.

Arriving at this point, we have nothing more to say. The consequences to be deduced from what we have said are within the comprehension of all.—We will only indicate three which we will recapitulate.

Oribe does not represent any Oriental authority whatever: he possesses no other character, no other representation than that of General of the army of Rosas, whose troops, arms, equipment, pay, pensions, &c. &c. proceed from Buenos Ayres and its treasury.

The Orientals who have taken up arms and joined Oribe, are an insignificant minority fighting under Rosas's flag, whose chiefs, officers, soldiers and their families, are in the pay of Buenos Ayres. They are, consequently no longer Orientals, according to the Constitution of the Republic, or of any country in the world. (1)

The Legal authority, the only one in the Republic, is that which maintains in Montevideo the honour of its flag, and the national independence; an authority by the side of which the Agents of all the nations friendly to the Republic reside, and which, therefore, has the sanction of National and Public Law.

(1) "The rights of citizenship are to be forfeited. . . . by accepting public places, distinctions or titles of any foreign Government, unless with the special permission of the General Assembly. (art. 12th of the Constitution of this Republic.